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REFLECTIONS ON THE CREATION OF THE
GREATER CITY OF NEW YORK AND ITS FIRST CHARTER,
1898
DAVID C. HAMMACK*
I. INTRODUCTION

I am delighted to be here to think aloud about the creation of Greater
New York. I have written at some length and in some detail about the
politics surrounding the creation of Greater New York in my book, Power
and Society: GreaterNew York at the Turn of the Century.' What I think
is most appropriate this afternoon is to highlight some matters that may be
related to continuing debates over the governance of New York City and
specifically to concerns of the recent Charter commission.
The sheer scale of New York following the consolidation one hundred
years ago was very impressive. 2 One measure of the scale is that for
almost fifty years after consolidation, almost all of the "suburban"
residential and commercial development within the State of New York
occurred within the five boroughs of the Greater City. 3 There was some
development along the main rail and highway lines beyond the city limits,
but Nassau, Suffolk, Orange, and even many parts of Westchester, counties
did not begin to fill up until after the Second World War.4 Consolidation
* Professor, Case Western Reserve University. Professor Hammack's book, Power
and Society: GreaterNew York at the Turn of the Century, is widely regarded as the leading
authority on New York City politics of this era. For that reason, many of the citations
throughout this article are to specific or general points in his book, which would be the best
source for a researcher to gather more information.
I. DAVID C. HAMMACK, POWER AND SOCIETY: GREATER NEW YORK AT THE TURN
OF THE CENTURY (1982).
2. See HAMMACK, supra note 1, at 32 (containing a map captioned The GreaterNew
York Region, 1898).
3. More than 70% of the population increase between 1900 and 1950 in New York
City and the counties of Nassau, Rockland, Suffolk, and Westchester took place in
Richmond County and the boroughs of Queens and Brooklyn. See IRA ROSENWAIKE,
POPULATION HISTORY OF NEW YORK CITY 132-34 (1972).

4. See HAMMACK, supra note 1, at 231-35 (discussing the evolution of a transit system
for Greater New York).
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created a single municipal arena for much of the urban development that
would take place around New York harbor for the next two generations. 5
Having a single municipal arena, instead of a congeries of small and
medium-sized towns, made a real difference to the quality of urban
development. 6 Commentators often emphasize the disparity between the
very rich and very poor in New York City, and disparagement of the City's
services is a local art.7 From the beginning, Greater New York embodied
forces that made for considerable uniformity and equity in the development
of municipal facilities and services throughout the five boroughs.!
Although this is not the place to make the argument, the Greater City
probably contributed to the growth of the region's middle class by
increasing access to public health, education, and jobs. 9
In fact, it is interesting to compare the development that took place in
the five boroughs of New York City with the development on the other side
of the Hudson River, where there was no consolidated government, even
though the population and economy are very much part of the metropolitan
region.'0 New Jersey did not create a "Greater Newark," and the result is
a New Jersey urban region that is sometimes compared to southern
California for its dispersion, variation in the quality of its public facilities,
and lack of civic focus and self-consciousness. The large scale of Greater
New York produced significant results.

5.

See JEAN GOTTMANN, MEGALOPOLIS: THE URBANIZED NORTHEASTERN SEABOARD

OF THE UNITED STATES 430 (1961); see also RAYMOND VERNON, METROPOLIS 1985, AT
133-34 (1960).
6. See HAMMACK, supra note 1, at 185 ("Touching at once on economic, political,
social, and cultural life, consolidation established enduring new boundaries and institutions
for the region and affected the relative value of the resources possessed by most of its
residents.").
7. See, e.g., JAMES D. MCCABE, JR., LIGHTS AND SHADOWS OF NEW YORK LIFE 57
(Farrar, Straus and Giroux 1970) (1872) ("[Tlhere are but two classes in the city-the poor
and the rich. The middle class, which is so numerous in other cities, hardly exists at all
here."). See generally HAMMACK, supra note 1, at 60-65 (section on Contemporary
Perceptions of New York Society).
8. See WALLACE S. SAYRE & HERBERT KAUFMAN, GOVERNING NEW YORK CITY:
POLITICS INTHE METROPOLIS 11-18 (W.W. Norton & Co., 1965) (1960).
9. See David C. Hammack, PoliticalParticipationand Municipal Policy: New York
City: 1870-1940, in BUDAPEST AND NEW YORK: STUDIES IN METROPOLITAN
TRANSFORMATION: 1870-1930, at 55-80 (Thomas Bender & Carl E. Schorske eds., 1994).
10. See ROBERT C. WOOD, 1400 GOVERNMENTS 104 (1961).
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Consolidation made New York City, which was already the great
center for the American investment industry," one of the most important
participants in the entire U.S. market for investments. ' 2 In the early years
of the twentieth century, New York City bonds sometimes played a more
important role in the financial markets than did the bonds of the United
States government. 3 As intended, consolidation created a major financial
entity. 4
Of course, consolidation created a large new political unit, raising
fundamental questions about how that unit was to be governed-through
what sort of government and with what kinds of elections.'"
II. A BRIEF LOOK AT THE PROCESS OF CONSOLIDATION

The consolidation of 1898 culminated a very long process-a process
that can be traced far back in the nineteenth century.16 One part of the
process was the creation of larger units of local government, long before
the 1898 consolidation.'" New York City had added a part of the Bronx in
1877;'1 the rest of the Bronx came in 1895.19 In the 1890s, Brooklyn also
added substantial territory, separate from New York City,2" by merging
11. See generally HAMMACK, supra note 1, at 33-51 (chapter on Economic Change
and Continuity stating that New York in the nineteenth century, prior to consolidation, drew
the largest share of capital seekers in the country).
12. See id. at 33 (explaining that "changes kept Greater New York in its dominant
position as the.., most important central business district in the nation's system of cities").
13.

See Hammack, Political Participation and Municipal Policy: New York City: 1870-

1940, supra note 9, at 75-76.
14. See generally HAMMACK, supra note 1, at 31-58 (discussing how consolidation
transformed New York City from merely a center of maritime commerce to the center of
corporate and financial powerhouses, both in terms of wealthy elite individuals and large
investment banks and industrial manufacturers).
15. See id. at 185-229 (chapter on Urbanization Policy outlining many of the issues
considered by City leadership at the time of consolidation).
16. See id. at 187 ("The idea that the region surrounding New York harbor ought to
have a single municipal government had a long history before 1898.").
17. See id. at 186 ("[Oiriginal advocates of Greater New York sought to minimize
[the] political implications ... [but] they could not deny that consolidation would abolish
the corporate identity of every constituent municipality and create a new electorate, twice
as large, even more diverse, and much more evenly balanced between the two major
political parties than in any of the original communities.").
18.

See id. at 129.

19. See id..
20. See HAROLD
(1944).

COFFIN SYRETT, THE CITY OF BROOKLYN,

1865-1898, at 197,245
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with the other towns of Kings County. 2' New Yorkers were thus moving
to larger government units; Greater New York was the largest and last of
these moves.
New Yorkers also engaged in continuing debates over the forms of
government to use for their cities.' One debate concerned the relative
powers of mayors and City Councils; by the 1890s, both New York City
and Brooklyn had, by some standards, a "strong mayor" form of
government. 23 Another debate involved the powers that municipal
governments should exercise: although many advocated change, the scope
of municipal powers did not change much in the last half of the nineteenth
century. 24 Still another debate concerned the use of commissions and other
devices: if a municipality lacked the power to address a new concern,
perhaps another arrangement could be devised for the purpose. 25 The
entire Greater New York area experienced innovation along these lines.26
Between 1857 and 1870 the State of New York created special commissions
to handle the building of Central and Prospect Parks and the general
physical development of large areas stretching north into Westchester and
east into Long Island.2 7 Commissions were also created to control the
police and fire departments of the metropolitan area.28 These commissions
were abolished in 1870,29 but the State turned again to a commission to
21. See generally id.(discussing the expansion of Brooklyn between 1854 and the
consolidation).
22. See generally HAMMACK, supra note 1, at 185-229. "The exact form of the new
city's government satisfied no one, but its boundaries, its division into boroughs.., have
all endured." Id. at 186.
23. See id. at 202 (Albert Shaw, a social reformer and instrumental figure during
consolidation, conceded, "[s]o long as nineteen-twentieths of our most active reformers
favor the plan of a strong mayor... I am not going to be an obstructionist").
24.

See, e.g., MEL SCOTT, AMERICAN CITY PLANNING SINCE 1890, at 26-27 (1976)

(discussing tension between state and local governments).
25. See, e.g., MARK I. GEFLAND, A NATION OF CITIES: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
AND URBAN AMERICA, 1933-1965, at 4-12 (1975) (discussing the legislature's granting of
additional authority to municipalities).
26. See HAMMACK, supra note 1, at 187-95.
27.

See id. at 188 ("In 1865 and 1866, the state ...

expanded the powers of the

Central Park Commission, giving it control over the street plan and most public works from
59th Street to the northern border of Westchester County.").
28. See id. In 1857, in order to facilitate the takeover of the New York, Richmond,
and Westchester county police departments, the New York State Legislature created the
Metropolitan Police Commission. In addition, in 1865, the legislature set up the
Metropolitan Fire Commission. See id.
29. See id. (mentioning the abolition of the commissions by the "Tweed Charter" of
1870).
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build the Brooklyn Bridge in the 1880s3 ° and to develop parks for upper
Manhattan in the 1890s. 3' The State also continued a practice, begun with
New York Hospital in the wake of the Revolution, of chartering special
corporations to conduct other activities, ranging from the Metropolitan
Museum of Art
and the Brooklyn Academy of Music to the State Charities
32
Aid Society.

Much of this sounds familiar, but in many ways the past really is
another country. When you venture back to see what was happening a
hundred years ago, you encounter realities, assumptions, ways of thinking,
institutional practices, coalitions, and other matters that are very different
from those that prevail at present. I want to emphasize two ways in which
the New York of a hundred years ago would seem very strange if we could
travel there today. The first concerns its people; the second concerns the
role of its city government.
III. NEW YORK CITY AS A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
New York City has been famous for ethnic, racial, and religious
diversity since the 1660s. 33 Toward the end of the nineteenth century,
however, the share of the city's population that might have been described
as "nonwhite" was small and declining; 34 the "nonwhite" share of the
state's population was even smaller.35 Only one or two percent of New
York and Brooklyn's populations were African American in the 1890s;36
few New Yorkers were of Hispanic, Caribbean, or Asian descent.3 7
Despite their tiny numbers, those who could be placed in these groups
faced a harsh color line and increasing discrimination. Their numbers and
resources were so small that they were unable to constitute a significant
political force, having to respond as individuals, families, and small
30. See id. at 198-99.
31. See id.
32. See David C. Hammack, Philanthropy,in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK, at
896-98 (Kenneth T. Jackson ed., 1995).
33. See, e.g., PATRICIA BONOMI, A FACTIOUS PEOPLE: POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN
COLONIAL NEW YORK (1971) (arguing that diversity has been present in New York City
since its earliest days).
34. See Hammack, Political Participationand Municipal Policy: New York City:
1870-1940, supra note 9, at 63.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
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groups.3" We must also recall that women did not get to vote until 1920;
New York's electorate was entirely male. Women, however, exerted
considerable influence in public affairs through their families or by working
in nonprofit corporations and organizing pressure groups. 9 Many of the
debates that dominated public discussion of politics in New York City and
New York State in the 1890s were rooted in ethnic and religious conflict.4"
The "Blaine Amendment," which forbade state aid to parochial schools,
was a key part of the New York State Constitution approved by voters in
1894. 41 Upstate Evangelicals insisted that Republicans support-and that
local officials enforce-liquor control laws that interfered with the customs
of New York City's Irish, German, Catholic, and Lutheran immigrant
communities.42
Municipal government, and New York City's government in particular,
was even less like what we might expect. Today, many New Yorkers take
great pride in the broad scope of the powers exercised by their City's
government; 43 others in New York, and more elsewhere, object to those
same powers. 44 The famous Dongan Charter a4 granted New York City's
colonial government control over nearly all of the East River and the right
to regulate trade.46 New York's municipal government, however, lost most
of its colonial-era commercial authority in the first half of the nineteenth
century. 47 New laws and court decisions constrained nineteenth-century
municipalities to a narrow range of activities, almost all of which
See, e.g., SETH SCHEINER, NEGRO MECCA: A HISTORY OF THE NEGRO IN NEW
1865-1920, at 8-9 (1965) (giving population figures for the African American
community in the late 1800s and early 1900s and putting them in the context of the
community's political powerlessness).
39. See HAMMACK, supranote 1, at 79 (charitable and religious organizations actually
provided women with the one field in which they could actively and directly participate in
forming public policy).
40. See id. at 60-61.
38.

YORK CITY,

41.

See JOHN WEBB PRATT, RELIGION, POLITICS, AND DIVERSITY: THE CHURCH STATE

THEME IN NEW YORK HISTORY 254-56 (1967); see also HAMMACK, supra note 1, at 260.
42. See HAMMACK, supra note 1, at 260.

43.

See id.

44.

See E. HAGAMAN HALL, THE SECOND CITY OF THE WORLD 19 (1898) (discussing

discontent with broad powers of the City government, even as it was being proposed and
constructed).
45. See id.
46. See id.; HAMMACK, supra note 1, at 186.
47.

See HENDRIK HARTOG,

PUBLIC

PROPERTY aND

PRIVATE

POWER: THE

CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730-1870, at 220-39

(1983)

(discussing the introduction of judicial intervention into local governmental authority).
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concerned physical development and public order.48 New York expanded
its physical development capabilities in the middle third of the century as
it gained control over the Croton and other watersheds.4 9 Control of
watersheds, reservoirs, and aqueducts gave New York City some initiative
as population concentrated in the metropolitan area.5 ° Nearby communities
could not expand without access to a water supply that New York City
already controlled.
We would also be surprised today by the limitations imposed on
nineteenth century New York City government. The courts enforced a
narrow doctrine of "municipal purpose," 5 as defined, for example, by
"Dillon's Rule." This rule stated that if a proposed activity of city
government did not concern streets, docks, public health, or public safety,
it was not a municipal purpose.5
If an activity was not a municipal
purpose, the courts would rule in favor of a taxpayer who challenged it,
whether the activity was carried on by a city government, a special
commission, or a special district that relied on taxes.53 Some activities
might have been assigned to nonprofit corporations, but political and legal
toleration for the provision of tax funds to such institutions was always
limited.54
In fact, tax-subsidized nonprofit corporations gave New York much of
its nineteenth-century reputation for having an active, wide-ranging
48. See id. at 220-24; see generally NELSON MANFRED BLAKE, WATER FOR THE
CITIES: A HISTORY OF THE URBAN WATERSUPPLY PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES (1956)
(discussing the development of the water supply companies for New York City and how the
City "wrestled" with the "water problem" in the early nineteenth century); CHARLES H.
WEIDNER, WATER FOR A CITY: A HISTORY OF NEW YORK'S PROBLEM FROM THE BEGINNING
TO THE DELAWARE RIVER SYSTEM (1974) (discussing efforts to bring an adequate water
supply to the city).
49. See BLAKE, supra note 48, at 121-30.

50. See id.
51. See generally CLYDE E. JACOBS, LAW WRITERS AND THE COURTS 134 (1973)
(expressing the idea that government aid to private business enterprises, except railroads,
was not "a public purpose for which the state legislatures could exercise their taxing and
spending powers").
52. See James W. Lowe, Examination of GovernmentalDecentralizationin New York
City and a New Modelfor Implementation, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 173, 184 (1990).
53. See id. at 186 (Dillon's Rule is named after John Dillon, whose 1872 treatise on
local government law set out the parameters of local authority which, in general, remain the

law today.).

See generally J.

DILLON,

A

TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL

CORPORATIONS (1872) (explaining that, under the public purpose rule, a state legislature
may only levy a tax to support a public or governmental endeavor); HARTOG, supra note
47, at 220-24 (discussing Dillon's Rule and its creation of a "municipal corporation");
JACOBS, supra note 51.
54. See Lowe, supra note 52, at 184.
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municipal government. 5
These included many famous institutions:
Columbia and New York universities; New York and other hospitals;
several Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish orphanages; the Metropolitan
Museum of Art; the American Museum of Natural History; the Brooklyn
Museum of Art; and the Brooklyn and New York public libraries. Until
well into the 1840s, public education in New York City was provided by
a private (though largely tax-supported) society called the Public School
Society.56 Although today we think of New York City as remarkable for
its commitment to public education, as late as 1900, it was still providing
only six years of free public school to most children notwithstanding the
fact that it had taken over the public schools before mid-century. 7
(Brooklyn provided more public secondary education toward the end of the
century.)58
In short, during the last third of the nineteenth century, New York
City, like other contemporary municipalities, was primarily a municipal
corporation that provided physical facilities and public safety. It existed to
establish and maintain a marketplace. It followed that one of its major
obligations was to earn a reputation for creditworthiness, so that it could
borrow in the bond market the funds needed to build its physical facilities.
The courts of the day subordinated concern about voter representation to
their concern for the City's management of tax money. In view of later
concerns about the implication of consolidation for the representativeness
of Greater New York's government, it is relevant to recall that the 1890s
and early 1900s saw the legal expulsion of African-American voters from
southern electorates and repeated defeats for the cause of women's
suffrage.5 9

55.

See Hannack, Philanthropy, supra note 32, at 896-97.

56.

See CARL F. KAESTLE, THE EVOLUTION OF AN URBAN SCHOOL SYSTEM, NEW

YORK CITY: 1750-1850, at 80, 87 (1973).
57. See HAMMACK, supra note 1, at 261 (noting that "there were primary schools for
children in grades one, two and three; grammar schools for grades four, five and six; night
schools that offered grammar and high school instruction to working children and adults").
58. In 1895, Brooklyn had three secondary schools, but New York City had just one.
See David Ment, Public Schools, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK 957-61 (Kenneth T.
Jackson ed., 1995).

59.

See J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE

RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH,

(1974).

1880-1910, at 32-33
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A. New York City's Questfor a Solid FinancialReputation:
From Boss Tweed to Tammany Hall
One place to start a quick review of the incidents that led to the
creation of Greater New York is the special state park, fire, and police
commissions of the Civil War period. 60 That entire period is usually
described as the era of Boss Tweed. 6' In fact, the "Tweed Era" was a
period of government by State Commissions whose members were
appointed by State authorities. In the face of these commissions, Tweed
devoted his entire career to fighting commission government and regaining
for the City of New York the power to elect its own officials and control
its own destiny.6' He finally succeeded in getting the state legislature to
approve the so-called Tweed Charter, which abolished all commissions.63
Tweed's enemies responded with the massive assault on his legitimacy that
has shaped his reputation to this day.64 In 1871, Tweed's government was
overthrown, and the former controller of Central Park, Andrew H. Green,
became the controller of New York City. 6 66Green prosecuted Tweed and
his associates over the next six years or so.
The movement against Tweed produced a revision of New York City's
Charter in 1873.67 The new Charter included institutional arrangements
that would guarantee the fiscal probity of New York City.6" Three other
elements wdre important in that Charter. One element was to give
considerable prominence to the City's mayor, with the idea of focusing
public attention on that individual. A second element of the 1873 Charter
was the creation of a daily publication, the City Record,69 which provided
60. See HAMMACK, supra note 1, at 188; see also The New York of Today: A Greater
City Comes into Being Without Any Visible Change in Conditions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1,
1898, at 3.
61. See generally SEYMOUR MANDELBAUM, Boss TWEED'S NEW YORK (John Wiley
& Son, Inc. 1965).
62.

See HAMMACK, supra note 1, at 188; see generally ALEXANDER B. CALLOW, JR.,

THE TWEED RING ch. 15 (1966).
63. See HAMMACK, supra note 1, at 188 (discussing the abolition of the commission
by the "Tweed Charter" of 1870).
64. See id.
65. See id. at 190.
66. See id.
67. See CALLOW, supra note 62, at 224-25.
68.

See EDWARD D. DURAND, THE FINANCES OF NEW YORK CITY 156 (1898)

(discussing the Charter's reinstatement of Council government along with the institution of
appropriate checks and balances therein).
69. See, e.g., CITY RECORD (New York, N.Y.), Oct. 2, 1876 at 1.
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extremely detailed reports of the actions of City government from the
1870s through the 1890s.7 ° The City Record printed every appointment: it
listed not only policemen and firemen but even the inspectors for every
election district for every election. 7 The third element was the creation of
a Board of Estimate. The Board was a small group of elected officials,
chiefly the mayor and the comptroller, who were responsible for the City's
finances.' They could not avoid the responsibility; they could not divide
it. They could not say, "well, the City Council made us do it." They had
considerable responsibility, and that gave the press a focus of attention for
monitoring New York's financial affairs.
For twenty years under this Charter, New York was led, not by
Tammany Hall, but by business leaders. Most of the mayors during that
period were not Tammany nominees but rather businessmen who agreed to
run out of civic duty and a desire to maintain the fiscal probity of the
City. 73 They were helped in their endeavors by the City Record and by the
City's eight daily English language newspapers and three daily German
language newspapers, which all followed city government affairs closely.74
The 1873 Charter encouraged full public disclosure in the interest of
maintaining an excellent credit rating, and it worked. Under intense daily
scrutiny, New York developed a well-earned reputation as a reliable
borrower. 75
Tammany Democrats played their role in the recovery of New York's
reputation for creditworthiness. 6 The great Tammany figure in this period
was "Honest" John Kelly, leader of Tammany Hall for almost twenty
years.77 Kelly won respect for his fiscal propriety, his modest personal
70.

See id.

71. See id.
72. See Joseph P. Viteritti, MunicipalHome Rule And The Conditions of Justifiable
Secession, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 51 (1995).
73. See generally HAMMACK, supra note 1, ch. 4-6; RICHARD S. WINSLOW, NEW
YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF INVESTIGATION CORRUPTION PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT
REVIEW BUREAU, ROGUES, RASCALS AND HEROES: A HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK CITY

DEPARTMENT OF INVESTIGATION, 1873-1993, at 4 (1993) (This desire for fiscally-minded
executives originated in the tremendous number of nationwide bankrupt businesses and
financial failures in 1873.); ROBERT VANWICK ET AL., BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF

AMERICAN MAYORS, 1820-1980: BIG CITY MAYORS 136-37 (1981) (discussing William
Grace as mayor under the 1873 Charter and his battle against Tammany Hall nominees).
74. See generally HAMMACK, supra note 1, at 132-33 (discussing how Tweed
manipulated public opinion by utilizing the New York Times, Evening Post, and other
publications).
75. See generally HAMMACK, supra note 1, at 190.
76. See HAMMACK, supra note 1, at 130-32.
77. See id.
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life, and his refusal to spend money on anything.7 s Because his definition79
of a legitimate public purpose was even more conservative than Dillon's,
Tammany Hall gradually regained the confidence of New York's investing
community.80 By the late 1880s, Tammany Hall was in a position to
actually begin to nominate some mayors and get them elected.
As they began to make a number of appointments and some decisions
that were not welcome in the 1890s, the new Tammany leaders faced the
glare of the publicity machine that followed the 1873 Charter. 82 It is
notable, however, that the famous Lexow and Mazet committee
investigations of Tammany leaders during the 1890s focused not on
financial mismanagement but on vice and moral corruption. 3 There was
no financial corruption, and all the big spenders were found in the
Republican Party and among the civic reformers, 4 not in the ranks of
Tammany Hall. The Tammany position as late as 1900 was that building
high schools in New York City would be a waste of money because
ordinary people could not afford to let their teenage children go to high
school.
A child between the ages of thirteen and fifteen had to be
working and earning money for the family budget. Tammany leaders thus
asked, why should the general taxpayer subsidize a school for a small
proportion of the population?
B. The FinalMovement for Consolidation:
The Role of the Chamber of Commerce
The movement for consolidation thus took place against the
background of a New York City government that had successfully sought
a reputation for economy and reliable financial management.8 6 The final
consolidation push involved a one-year process led by New York's great
78. See generally id. (discussing attempts made by a faction of Democrats to gain
control over the Democratic Party after Tweed left, rallying behind Kelly).
79. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54 (discussing Dillon's Rule).
80. See HAMMACK, supra note 1, at 164.
81. See id. (discussing the nominations of Hugh Grant and Thomas Gilroy between
1884 and 1892).
82. See id. at 165-66.
83. See id. at 166 (stating that "the Lexow Committee's... indiscriminate attacks on
Tammany morality were bound to damage the uptown leaders' standing in the business
world...").
84. See HAMMACK, supra note 1, at 140-57.
85. See David C. Hammack, The Centralization of New York City's School System
(1970) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Columbia University) (on file with author).
86. See HAMMACK, supra note 1, at 186-87.
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business organization of the period, the Chamber of Commerce of the State
of New York. 7 In stark contrast to today, New York City's most
important economic leaders in 1890 were import/export wholesale
merchants. 88 The Fortune 500 did not yet exist; there was no Dow Jones
Industrial Average. Before 1895, the New York Stock Exchange handled
railroad stocks and bonds and government bonds but not industrial
securities. 89 By 1900, the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the equivalent
of the Fortune 500 existed: a business revolution took place just before the
turn of the century. The Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York,
the most important business organization of the 1880s and 1890s,
represented the great merchants who coordinated the economy in the period
before the rise of large vertically integrated corporations.'
In their last decade of dominance, New York's great merchants had
several pressing concerns. 9' They located in New York to take advantage
of New York harbor, but the harbor was almost impassible. Garbage,
flotsam and jetsam, and the rotting timbers of abandoned wharves clogged
the waters and damaged vessels. Nonessential users of the harbor got in
the way of essential users.92 These problems could most effectively be
addressed through a consolidated municipal unit. The effort to gain control
of the entire harbor led to the inclusion in Greater New York of Queens,
east of what is now Kennedy Airport and all the way beyond the
Whitestone Bridge, and of the Bronx and Staten Island. 93
New York City also lacked a direct connection to the national railroad
system. The Pennsylvania Railroad eventually built a tunnel for passenger
trains under the Hudson River, but not until much later.9 4 Meanwhile, rail
shipments had to make their way from New Jersey into New York or
Brooklyn by means of lighters and barges-or travel many extra miles. At
the end of the nineteenth century, international and interstate shippers had
87. See id. at 52, 188.
88.
89.

See id. at 46-51.
See Thomas R. Navin & Marian V. Sears, The Rise of a Market for Industrial
Securities, 1887-1902, 29 Bus. HIST. REV. 105, 106; HAMMACK, supra note 1, at 39-44.

90. See HAMMACK, supra note 1, at 52.
91. See, e.g., id. at 65.
92. See HAMMACK, supra note 1, at 193-94.
93. See id. at 185, 194.
94. See Mary Betts, Pennsylvania Station, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK 89091 (Kenneth T. Jackson ed., 1995). It is interesting to note that now, 100 years later,
government leaders are once again promoting the idea of a freight tunnel from Brooklyn to
Staten Island. See David C. Hammack, Developingfor CommercialCulture, in INVENTING
TIMES SQUARE: COMMERCE AND CULTURE AT THE CROSSROADS OF THE WORLD

(William L. Dalton ed., 1991).
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to share the waterways with the railroads, adding to the crowding. New
York was at the mercy of terminal facilities in New Jersey.
The great merchants were also concerned about lower Manhattan,
where most wholesale and financial business was concentrated.95 Lower
Manhattan's streets were enormously crowded with carts, horses, trams,
and pushcarts.96 Goods came into the city by ship, to be moved into
warehouses and then into plants and workshops for processing and
manufacturing. Dock and factory workers could not afford the money or
time required to live away from their work, so they and their families lived
near the docks and joined the street crowds. It was so difficult to walk that
messengers were delayed in going from one brokerage house to another. 97
Many merchants saw a need to disperse many kinds98 of economic activity,
which was another consideration for the Chamber.
Some merchants also argued that New York had to respond to London,
which had just created a County Council and expanded its government, and
to Chicago, which had recently annexed large, densely populated areas. 99
Bragging rights were at stake, as was the ability to influence national
transportation policy.
Chamber of Commerce leaders also knew that lower Manhattan's
crowded, unhealthy slums were filled with miserable people who were
often sick. 00 It was not good for business for New York to be known as
a place where clothing was made by people who had tuberculosis. Nor
would it be good for business if slum conditions encouraged socialist
sympathies. In a real sense, one of the purposes of Greater New York was
to create "Archie Bunker.' 0 1 Advocates for consolidation argued that new
bridges, new water and sewer connections, and a mortgage would allow
Lower East Side renters to move into row houses in Brooklyn or Queens,
thus warding off potential political problems.
95. See generally HAMMACK, supra note 1, at 31-36 (discussing the lower one-third
of Manhattan as the center of commerce until approximately 1910 or 1915).
96. See Luc SANTE, Low LIFE, OLD NEW YORK, 46-47 (1991) ("There was a distinct
absence of grand boulevards and parkways, and major thoroughfares were essentially
corridors. They were, of course, crowded down the middle and along their walks as well;
a heavy concentration of wheeled and pedestrian traffic had been constant for the next 200
years.").
97. See HAMMACK, supra note 1, at 31-44, 192-93.
98. See David R. Stabile, New York Chamber of Commerce and Industry, in THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK 825-26 (Kenneth T. Jackson ed., 1995).
99. See HAMMACK, supra note 1, at 200-02.

100. See id.
101. See id. at 203.
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The Chamber's leaders knew that property owners and developers in
Brooklyn and Queens were eager to accommodate refugees from
Manhattan. 0 2 Bridges could be built, with some difficulty, through
municipal agreements or special commissions, as in the case of the
Brooklyn Bridge. 3 Developers could not, however, build much new
housing until Brooklyn, Long Island City, and adjoining municipalities
found a way to build new streets, water mains, sewers, and police and fire
stations."10 To do this, these municipalities had to improve their financial
standing. In the early 1890s Brooklyn annexed all the surrounding towns
and immediately found itself unable to borrow any more money.'OS It had
reached the state-defined debt limit, set as a proportion of a municipality's
assessed valuation. 0 6 Brooklyn faced a special problem because much of
the central business district that served Brooklyn was in Manhattan and the
total value of the property located within Brooklyn was lower than one
would expect for a city of its population."o The only way Brooklyn could
borrow more money would have been to raise its assessments, a move that
would have increased the taxes Brooklyn property owners had to pay the
State of New York, which relied on local assessments when it levied its
own property tax.'0 8 Brooklyn officials also found the records of the
annexed communities in deplorable shape. For years, they literally did not
know what obligations their City had assumed through its annexations. 09
Even if Brooklyn had been able to borrow more money, it would have
been forced to turn to New York City for water. Brooklyn relied on
shallow wells, which had reached their capacity, while New York City had
developed upstate water supplies. "o
102.

See id. at 196, 203.

103. See The New York of Today, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 1, 1898, at Al; DAVID
MCCULLOUGH, THE GREAT BRIDGE 24 (1972) (discussing how the construction of the "East
River bridge," for example, occurred only after a Charter was voted on in Albany by the
legislature).

104. For a discussion of the financial problems that plagued Long Island City and
other towns in Queens during the 1880s and 1890s, see Paul E. Kerson, Union of Queens
with New York City: What Was Gained and What Was Lost (Apr. 15, 1998) (unpublished
paper presented at the conference on Queens History, 350 Years of Life in Queens, Queens
Historical Society) (on file with author).
105. In fact, Brooklyn began annexation in earnest by 1855. The new City of
Brooklyn contained Williamsburg and Bushwick. See DAVID W. MCCULLOUGH,
BROOKLYN AND How IT GOT THAT WAY 29 (1942).
106. See HAMMACK, supra note 1, at 198.
107.
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The Chamber of Commerce and Brooklyn real estate leaders were
lured by New York City's water supply and pushed for consolidation on
that basis."1 '
Opposition came mainly from three sources. Despite suggestions that
consolidation deprived Brooklyn of a chance for democratic selfgovernment,1 2 in the 1890s the biggest opposition came from Brooklyn,
not from Democrats." 3 Brooklyn opposition came from Protestants who
explicitly objected to the likelihood that consolidation would accelerate the
movement of Catholic and Jewish immigrants across the East River,
disrupting Brooklyn's New England culture of civic engagement, Protestant
churches, clubs, libraries, and good schools."' This was a rear-guard
opposition by self-appointed representatives of perhaps one third of
Brooklyn's already quite diverse population." 5 Many Protestant Chamber
of Commerce leaders lived in Brooklyn; like the City's Jewish business
leaders and many of its Catholics, they strongly favored consolidation. 116
A second source of opposition to consolidation came from political
leaders in Brooklyn and Queens who doubted that they would benefit from
a greater city." 7 A greater city would force them to compete in a bigger
arena, and they did not like their chances." 8 Contrary to Staten Island's
recent strong secession movement, in the 1890s Staten Island's voters and
elected leaders strongly favored consolidation with New York as likely to
speed economic development." 9
The third important source of opposition came from developers of real
estate and their political allies in upper Manhattan and especially in the
Bronx. 120 These individuals listened to the advocates of consolidation and
concluded, reasonably enough, that it would divert resources and new
residents away from their areas and into Brooklyn and Queens.' 2
111. See id. at 196-98.
112. See Richard E. Mooney, A 300 Year Dress Rehearsal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25,
1998, § 15, at 2.
113. See HAMMACK, supra note 1, at 209.
114. See id. at 210 ("[The opposition groups] were deeply indebted to Brooklyn's
Anglo-American Protestant institutions and the way of life those institutions symbolized and
encouraged.").
115. See id. at 212-13.
116. See id. at 196-97.
117. See id. at 217, 222, 224-25.
118. See id. at 209.
119. See id. at 195 n.36, 206-25.
120. See id. at 196 n.52, 214.
121. See id. at 199, 220.
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IV. THE ROLE OF STATE GOVERNMENT IN THE CONSOLIDATION
The story of the consolidation campaign is complicated, full of long,
complex political jousting. The Chamber of Commerce of the State of
New York played a key role in placing the issue on the table, but it did not
control the outcome. " Ultimately, consolidation was a matter for the state
government.' Thomas Platt,24leader of the state Republican Party at that
time, arranged the final deal. 1
Platt had the notion, realistic at the time, that if things fell the right
way, the Republicans could organize the Greater City and control its
elected government indefinitely." Like Marcus Alonzo Hanna of Ohio,
Platt was a Republican who counted voters and concluded that it was
26
necessary to represent workers, as well as farmers and employers.1
Platt's was the party of the full dinner pail and the proper representation of
ethnic interests. 2 ' For years Platt had been fighting people he saw as
narrow-minded bigots in Brooklyn and upstate. 2 He took 29considerable
pleasure in defeating their resistance to Greater New York.
The Charter that was finally written by a commission appointed by the
governor and adopted by the state legislature in 1898, and under which the
Greater City started its career in 1898, was shaped by the political debate
that I have described here. 3
To placate Brooklyn, taxes and assessments were to be equalized
throughout Greater New York."' Brooklyn got equal taxes and assessment
and access to the borrowing capacity of the Greater City.'32 Brooklyn also
122.
123.
124.
125.

See id. at 214.
See id. at 214-17.
See id.
That may sound like another way in which the past is strange to us, but, after all,

Fiorello H. LaGuardia was a Republican and Platt was thinking in broad terms.
Republicans also sought control of local City municipalities and departments in general. See
id. at 214-19.
126. Platt understood the importance of supporting broad groups within the New York
citizenry. See id. at 214-18.

127. See id.
128. See id. at 165 (citing an example of anti-Republican rhetoric among anti-Semitic
groups). The classic account of Platt's career is HAROLD C. GOSNELL, Boss PLATT AND
His NEW YORK MACHINE (1969).

129. See HAMMACK, supra note 1, at 216.
130.
131.
132.

See id. at 223-27.
See id. at 224.
See id.
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got the borough system.'3 3 The Charter Commission considered as an
alternative, local governing units that were smaller, more coherent, and
possibly more representative.'
Brooklyn already existed, however, and
its leaders insisted that it retain its identity. 35 Brooklyn leaders succeeded
in keeping their prized schools separate from those of Manhattan and the
other parts of the new city; full consolidation of the school system took
about twenty years. 36
Brooklyn already had a relatively strong mayor, and New York had a
stronger mayor. Strong mayoral leadership, which we could trace back to
the logic of the 1873 Charter,137 was carried over into the Greater City.
Again following the logic of the Charter of 1873, the mayor became a
member of a small Board of Estimate that included the comptroller and
concentrated responsibility for financial decisions. 38 The 1898 Charter
also retained 1873's
emphasis on full financial disclosure through a detailed
39
City Record.1
The chief innovation of the 1898 Charter was a new Board of Public
Improvements, with a Commissioner of Public Improvements for each of
the boroughs as well as some citywide officials. 40 The Commissioner of
Public Improvements was the key office in borough government as it was
originally created."'4 Seth Low, a former mayor of Brooklyn who later
became mayor of New York, was the member of the 1898 Charter
Commission who pushed for the Board of Public Improvements.' 42
Following the rationale of the Charter of 1873, Low sought to create a
body whose powers over public improvements and finances would attract
continuous press attention, forcing it to act in the strong light of
publicity. 143 Critics warned that the new Board would be a politically
133. See id.
134. See id. at 225.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See generally N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 4 §§ 94-5, 99-100, 109; ch. 5 §§ 115,
117-19 (1897).
138. See id. ch. 6 § 226 (illustrating the constitution of the Board of Estimate as well
as discussing when the Board meets to create an "estimation of necessary expenditures to
pay city debt").
139. See id. ch. 22 § 1526; ch. 6 § 161.
140. See IAMMACK, supra note 1, at 225-26.
141. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER art. VIII, § 70 (1873); see also N.Y. CITY CHARTER
ch. 10 §§ 410-11 (1897) (referring to the Commissioner as president of the Board of Public

Improvements).
142.
143.
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See id.at 226.
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unaccountable monstrosity. 144 When Platt's forces split the anti-Tammany
vote in the first election for mayor of the Greater City and Tammany's
William Van Wyck defeated Low for the office, the critics persuaded a new
governor to appoint a Charter Revision Commission, which eliminated the
Board of Public Improvements. 145 The Charters for the greater City,
however, retained the Board of Estimate and Apportionment, simply
expanding its membership to include the borough leaders and the President
of the City Council.' 4F These arrangements assured the financial
community that Greater New York would continue old New York's record
of financial responsibility and allowed the consolidated City to borrow
47
enormous sums for public improvements at favorable interest rates. 1
V. CONCLUSION
The movement to create Greater New York grew out of the campaign
to expand the capacity of American cities to achieve a wider range of
purposes. This campaign had many sources. 41 I have noted above a
variety of commercial and political concerns. In addition, public health
concerns played a central role; the confirmation of the germ theory of
disease in the 1880s forced community leaders throughout the world to
spend vast sums on new water and sewer facilities. 44 The demand for
other services was also rising. Increasing numbers of voters favored public
education for their children, for example, and by the 1910s Tammany
leaders competed with Republicans to support the expansion of the school
system. 50
As New York City has expanded the definition of municipal purpose,
it has become more important that its government not only provide good
services efficiently and maintain creditworthiness in the bond markets, but
also that it be representative of its population. The "one person-one vote"
principle was not a particularly strong consideration at the end of the
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146. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 6 § 226 (1897).
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nineteenth century."' It has become a much stronger consideration in the
twentieth century."5 2 Hence it is no surprise that representation became a
central concern for Charter Revision Commissions in more recent years.

151. See HAMMACK, supranote 1, at 322-26 (section titled The IncreasingDispersal
of Powerin the Cities of the United States during the Twentieth Century).
152. See id.

